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ANITrRUST POLICY AND THE CONCEPT OF
A COMPETITIVE PROCESS*
JOHN J. FLYNN**

[A]n economic system is not only an institutional device for
satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of creating and
fashioning wants in the future. How men work together now to
satisfy their present desires affects the desires they will have later
on, the kind of persons they will be . . . . Since economic
arrangements have these effects, and indeed must do so, the
choice of these institutions involves some view of human good
and of the design of institutions to realize it. The choice must,
therefore, be made on moral and political as well as on economic
grounds. Considerations of efficiency are but one basis of decision
and often relatively minor at that.1
I. INTRODUCTION

The use of concepts to systematize and categorize, and to determine
what rules are relevant to a dispute and what facts are "facts" for purposes
of its resolution, is a central and universal feature of all legal systems.
Concepts liberate our thinldng by enabling the universal to be abstracted
from the particular. Concepts impose an order on the chaos of reality,
enabling the rational resolution of disputes to take place. But concepts can
mislead by focusing one's vision of the values and rules related to a
particular dispute too narrowly, blinding one to a fuller understanding of
the complexity involved in a dispute. In law, economics, and every other
intellectual discipline, concepts can so capture one's capacity for reflective
thought that they cause a divorce of policy from reality, and conclusions
from their consequences. In so doing, concepts take on a life of their own,
detached from the policy responsible for their birth, the reality which has
guided and molded their growth, and the consequences of their application
in a particular case. While the forms of action may rule us from the grave,
the concepts and language used to express them rule us from the here and
now. Paradoxically, one must master concepts to understand and organize
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1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTicE 259-60 (1971).
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reality, yet escape them at the same time in order to use concepts
functionally in the creative resolution of disputes.
Felix Cohen, commenting on a series of cases in the 1930s where the
concept of "corporation" had taken on a life independent of the reasons for
recognizing its existence, introduced his discussion of the tendency to
"thingify" abstract concepts by recalling a curious dream the German jurist
von Jhering once had about the concepts of the law.2 Von Jhering
dreamed that he had died and gone to a special heaven reserved for the
theoreticians of the law, where
one met, face to face, the many concepts of jurisprudence in their
absolute purity, freed from all entangling alliances with human
life. Here were the disembodied spirits of good faith and bad faith,
property, possession, laches, and rights in rem. Here were all the
logical instruments needed to manipulate and transform these legal
concepts and thus to create and to solve the most beautiful of
legal problems. Here one found a dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation
press, which could press an indefinite number of meanings out of
any text or statute, an apparatus for constructing fictions, and a
hair-splitting machine that could divide a single hair into 999,999
equal parts, and when operated by the most expert jurists, could
split each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts. The
boundless opportunities of this heaven of legal concepts were open
to all properly qualified jurists, provided only they drank the
Lethean draught which induced forgetfulness of terrestrial human
affairs. But for the most accomplished jurists the Lethean draught
was entirely superfluous. They had nothing to forget.3
In discussing the appropriate use of economics in fashioning an
understanding of the public interest in antitrust law, we flirt with the
possibility of becoming inmates of von Jhering's heaven of legal concepts
as we sally forth to taste what has become for many a modem Lethean
draught-the identification of the public interest in antitrust enforcement
with the concept of "competition," the meaning of which is too often
confined to the definitions provided by a static and abstract form of
economic analysis. It is a drink which causes some to divorce law-and the
concepts it uses to resolve disputes-from the broader policies behind the
law, the facts of particular disputes, the institutional arrangements
surrounding the legal process, the inductive methodology inherent in the
2. See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 809 (1935).
3. Id (emphasis omitted) (citing R. VON JHERJNG, Im Juristischen Begriffshimmel, in
ScHERz UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ 245 (11th ed. 1912)).

1990]

COMPETI7VE PROCESS

decision-making processes of law, and the practical consequences of the
decision made.
The association of antitrust policy and its objective of serving the
"public interest" with the concept of "competition," and the movement to
lock the meaning of the concept of "competition" to the tautological
definition of "efficiency," derived from manipulation of the hypothetical
assumptions and deductively derived abstract conclusions of neoclassical
price theory,4 have become central features of modem antitrust litigation.
Lest we all become inmates of von Jhering's heaven of legal concepts, it
is time that the concept of "competition" be understood in a broader sense,
and that it be used in a functional way to connect the normative goals
underlying the law to the reality and circumstances of particular disputes,
in light of the immediate and long-term social, political, and economic
consequences of the decisions being made.
4. Some advocates of an exclusive reliance upon the model of neoclassical price theory
claim it is "scientifically" inappropriate to compare reality with the assumptions of the
model. They argue that the appropriate test of the model's validity should be accomplished
by comparing the implications of the model with the facts observed. See, e.g., M.
FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of PositiveEconomics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3
(1966). This form of reasoning has been described as "the curious notion that we must test
a theory's implications against fact, but not its assumptions." Wiles, Ideology, Methodology
and NeoclassicalEconomics, 2 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 155, 179 n.24 (1979-80).
There is a deeper problem with this methodology of rigid positivism or formalism that
has been well-recognized by lawyers and the legal process at least since the time of
Cardozo's Nature ofthe JudicialProcess.See B. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921); see also G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) (discussing
the evolution of American law through the pre-Civil War period, the pre-World War II
period, and the post-World War H period). A theory's implications or conclusions determine
what is "fact" and always conform with the predictions of the model, since the underlying
assumptions of fact and normative values dictate what the theory will or will not consider
fact. See Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L. REv.
335, 368 (1980) [hereinafter Flynn, Misuse of EconomicAnalysis]. Such a reasoning process
causes one to ignore all of the reality involved in a particular case or to ignore alternative
explanations for the practices involved. For example, the harsh criticism of United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), by neoclassical theorists overlooked the reality of the
case and the consequences of the Court's decision. For such criticism, see Mueller, The
Sealy Restraints: Restrictionson Free Riding or Output?, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1255. The
capture of the Court's understanding of the facts and law by conclusions of neoclassical
price theory in Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), caused the Court to ignore both alternative explanations for the practices involved
and the constitutional constraints upon the division of judge and jury functions. See Flynn,
An Antitrust Allegory, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 517 (1987) [hereinafter Flynn, Antitrust Allegory]
(discussing the Court's disregard of constitutional constraints); Note, Below-Cost Sales and
the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. REv. 695 (1990) (discussing the Court's disregard
of alternative explanations of the activities at issue).
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In order to achieve these ends, it is essential to antitrust policy that the
concept of "competition" be understood as "competition as a process," that
its meanin be derived from a multiplicity of disciplines, including
economics, and that the deeper normative meaning of the concept be
properly understood and inductively employed. Further, it is essential that,

in the application of the concept of competition as a process, the
methodology of antitrust analysis escape the rigid formalism and deductive
methodology associated with neoclassical economic analysis, and that the
concept be used functionally-as a means to the end of organizing,
understanding, and dealing with reality in light of the normative objectives
of the law, not as an end in itself. Otherwise, the development of antitrust
policy faces what Roscoe Pound called "a jurisprudence of conceptions" 6
and what Benjamin Cardozo described as "the extension of a maxim or a
definition with relentless disregard of consequences 'to a dryly logical
extreme' ... [where the] approximate and relative become the definite and
absolute."7
5. Antitrust policy has always been informed by economics, and rightly so. Like any
of the other sources of wisdom for antitrust policy, economic theory and empirical
investigation have much to offer the development and wise application of antitrust policy.
But, like any other source of insight, economics must be used reflectively and must travel
only so far as the reality of the dispute admits, while also being balanced with the other
sources of insight for antitrust and the limits upon the judicial and legal process. There is
no place in antitrust analysis for the mechanical application of economic ideology divorced
from the reality of the dispute before the court, the hiding and distorting of the normative
values involved in the dispute, ignoring of the inductive use of the legal process, and the
use of dogmatic generalities which quickly outpace their justification. Much of the criticism
in this article is directed to these misuses of economics and economic theorizing,
particularly where they have become formulae displacing the reflective analysis of disputes
in light of the values underlying the law and the legal process and in view of the
consequences of the decision made. See generally Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy
and the Social "Science" of Economics, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 713 (1988) (discussing and
criticizing the application of neoclassical economic theory to antitrust policy).
6. Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 608, 610 (1908). Pound
further observed:
I have referred to mechanical jurisprudence as scientific because those who
administer it believe it such. But in truth it is not science at all. We no longer
hold anything scientific merely because it exhibits a rigid scheme of deductions
from a prioriconceptions. In the philosophy of to-day, theories are "instruments,
not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest." The idea of science as a system
of deductions has become obsolete, and the revolution which has taken place in
other sciences in this regard must take place and is taking place in jurisprudence
also.... We do not base institutions upon deduction from assumed principles of
human nature; we require them to exhibit practical utility, and we rest them upon
a foundation of policy and established adaptation to human needs.
Id. at 608-09 (footnotes omitted).
7. Hynes v. New York Cent. R.R., 231 N.Y. 229, 235, 131 N.E. 898, 900 (1921)
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I. THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITION AS A PROCESS

The recent history of American antitrust policy has reflected a tension
between goals of developing rules which facilitate a utilitarian vision of
economic "efficiency" and rules designed to ensure the control of

economic power that is incompatible with the social and political values
of a just community, the integrity of individualism in that community, and
the ideal of equality of economic opportunity.' Modem antitrust cases
often identify the former value with the concept of "competition" and
derive its meaning exclusively from neoclassical price theory. The latter is
often identified by the concept of a "competitive process" and derives its
meaning from a multiplicity of social sciences including history,
economics, philosophy, political science, and sociology. The distinction is
more than verbal, since the concept of "competition" is often identified
with narrow and self-defining goals for antitrust policy advocated by
neoclassical price theory, while the concept of "competitive process" is
identified with a broader vision of the goals of antitrust policy-a mix of
social, political, and economic goals.9
The tension between these two views is often increased to a breaking
point by the insistence that one vision of the underlying objectives of
antitrust policy be followed to the total exclusion of the other, and by the
denial of the deeper complex of normative values which provide the
(quoting Pound, supra note 6, at 608, 610).
8. From the beginning,
two presumptions about antitrust enforcement have contended for judicial and
congressional favor. One says that all doubts should be resolved in favor of
freedom of contract-provided the cost is not too great. The other says that all
doubts should be resolved in favor of decentralized decision maling-provided the
cost is not too great.
Dewey, Economists and Antitrust: The Circular Road, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 371
(1990); see also Peritz,A Counter-HistoryofAntitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263. Professor
Peritz maintains that antitrust history and current debates about antitrust policy reflect the
tension between viewing the law as the expression of both a competition policy and a
property policy, with each policy representing a commitment to deeper normative values of
liberty and equality. He notes in the conclusion to his insightful article that
[i]n observing the Sherman Act's centennial, it is important to remember that
antitrust law for most of its existence has been understood as a public interest law
designed to regulate the exercise of private economic power.... Under the "rule
of reason," which has dominated antitrust discourse since 1911, courts have
sought to mediate the tension between individual rights of liberty and property,
and public interests understood as commitments to competition and equality.

Id at 317.
9. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 11729 (1978); May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
ConstitutionalandAntitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 Onio ST. L.J. 257, 270-77 (1989).
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cohesion of cultural values, reflected by the law and the legal process
binding a society together.1" Those deeper values often involve balancing
concerns for liberty and equality in the complex process of reconciling the
need for protecting individualism and community. Antitrust policy plays
a fundamental part in defining the scope of property rights in our society
by balancing the rights of individuals and communities in the private
economic sphere. Antitrust policy does not proceed from the assumption
that such rights are pre-existing and that its function is to protect
individuals in the exercise of their absolute property and contract rights
from interference by government." The issues are far more complex than
this12 and require a deeper, more sophisticated understanding of the
normative values underlying antitrust policy, contract law, property law,
and various schools of economic and political thought.
A second tension has also existed throughout the history of antitrust.
The demand for certainty and predictability in the rules governing
economic transactions, in order to facilitate planning and investment, stands
in opposition to the demand for flexibility, which allows facts that are
unique to an industry or practice to be accounted for in assessing whether
10. See D. ARmENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 5-15 (1986)
(discussing the tensions between those who believe antitrust regulation protects the economy
and furthers competition and those who believe antitrust regulation hampers the efficient
competitive process); Peritz, A Genealogyof Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.
511 (1989) (stating that the Supreme Court has adopted the framework of tensions between
competition policy and common-law property rights).
11. See Flynn, The Chicken and the Egg, in FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ECONOMIC ROLE
OF GOVERNMENT 69 (W.Samuels ed. 1989) [hereinafter Flynn, The Chicken and the Egg];
Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, 'Original Intent' and the Legislative
History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTrmUST BULL 259 (1988) [hereinafter Flynn, Reagan
Antitrust Policy].
12. Both property and contract rights
are, of course, creations of society and its legal system as part of the process by
which the values of individualism and community are implemented in light of the
realities confronting that society and its underlying moral ideals.... Property is
not a concept describing rights in things, but is a functional concept recognized
by a legal system and describing the relationship between individuals with respect
to interests where the legal system will enforce a right to exclude others....
Similarly, the concept of "contract" is a functional one recognizing a relational
interest founded on consent where the authority of the community will be brought
to bear to enforce a consensual agreement and defining the circumstances in
which this is the case.....
Antitrust policy should be viewed as it originally was in the Addyston Pipe
& Steel case ... as part of the fundamental laws defining the scope of property
and contract rights, rather than as a bothersome limitation upon the unfettered
right to invoke the community's law to exercise such rights ....
Flynn, supra note 5, at 730 n.22 (citations omitted).
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the conduct or structures involved comport with the normative values
underlying the complex of beliefs about justice that prevail in our culture.
Accommodating the demand for predictability led antitrust to adopt, for a
time, rigid rules of per se illegality.13 More currently, this demand has led
to the adoption of an exclusive reliance upon the positivism of neoclassical
economic theorizing to define the rules which ought to be followed, and
to identify the facts and policies which should be deemed relevant-and
which ones should be ignored-in resolving antitrust cases.14 Both
approaches are susceptible to a mechanical methodology, incapable of
confronting either the reality of particular cases, the normative values
which underlie the law, or the inductive reasoning process required by a
common-law system of analysis. Concepts are used by both methodologies
as rigidly defined categories of fact and value to which reality and goals
of the law must conform rather than vice versa. But, as Karl Llewellyn
observed, "a realistic approach to any new problem would begin by
skepticism as to the adequacy of the received categories for ordering the
phenomena effectively toward a solution of the new problem."' 5
Both the neoclassical and per se approaches are also vulnerable to the
practice of assuming that which is to be decided in most antitrust cases: the
normative reasons for permitting or not permitting the particular exercise
of property or contract rights being asserted in the dispute. Antitrust laws
ought to be viewed as part of our basic laws which define the scope and
meaning of property and contract rights. They should be viewed as
relational rights created by law to achieve well-defined normative goals in
light of evolving reality, not as pre-existing and fixed rights inherent in
each individual.
13. See, e.g., E. SINGER, ANTITRUST EcoNoMIcs 198-201 (1968) (a tying arrangement
in which a customer is required to purchase a product he does not necessarily want in order

to secure one he desires is considered coercion and a per se violation of antitrust laws);
Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposalsfor Reducing the
Chaos, 49 ANTrrRUST L.J. 1593, 1615 (1980) (where private parties acting in a proprietary
capacity engage in conduct displacing the competitive process, such as price-fixing or
vertical market division, the conduct is presumed unlawful).
14. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986),
where the Court relied upon the neoclassical model to establish the following guidelines in
resolving antitrust litigation: that the sole goal of entities in a competitive market is to
maximize profit; that claims of predatory pricing are unlikely to occur in any circumstances;
that defendants are not likely to recoup losses from a predatory pricing scheme and thus
have no motive to engage in such conduct; and that "courts should not permit factfinders
to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible [as determined by the
neoclassical model] because the effect of such practices is often to deter procompetitive
conduct." Id. at 594.
15. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: RFALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 27 (1962).
16. For more on this notion, see Flynn, The Chicken andthe Egg, supranote 11, at 69;
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Neoclassical thought assumes the existence of contract and property
rights inhering in the individual, and views the antitrust laws as placing
presumptively inappropriate constraints upon the exercise of those preexisting rights, unless that exercise is specifically shown by the predictions
of the model to deter economic "efficiency." When coupled with the
assumptions that individuals are "rational maximizers" and that the law
should permit individuals to exercise fully their preferences to maximize
overall
utility and "efficiency," very few acts will be found to violate the
17
law.

Per se analysis begins with the assumption that defined categories of

conduct under all circumstances will violate the policies behind the law,
without regard for the values underlying the recognition of relational rights
of property and contract or the circumstances of individual cases. Once
again, the focus of the analysis becomes a definitional one-a cataloguing
of conduct as within or without the category defined as illegal, with
reference only to the definition.18 The question of what ought to be the
see also Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and its Relationship to Modern
Legal Thought, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 871 (1986) (stating that the Coase theorem can only
be understood in light of the vision of distributive justice and the political perspective that
it incorporates).
17. Economics and antitrust
have long been wed. Economic analysis has been a vital analytical tool of public
and private antitrust enforcement for decades. The Chicago School did not "bring
numbers" to antitrust analysis. What is different about the role of economics
today... is the use to which economic principles are being put. Economics is
not a way in, but a way out. It has become a blunt tool for narrowing the scope
of antitrust-not merely refining the law's edges-without the need for overruling
precedent or seeking a legislative amendment.
Melsheimer, Economics andIdeology: Antitrustin the 1980s, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1319, 1321
(1990); see also Flynn, The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules in Vertical Market
Restraints,58 WASH. U.L.Q. 767 (1980), which states that
[if one begins with the proposition that the sole goal of antitrust policy is to
maximize "consumer welfare"

. ...

[o]nly those restraints that quantitatively

displace the "market" and impair "consumer welfare" are unlawful under the
antitrust laws because all others are either promoting "consumer welfare" or will
be efficiently remedied by the functioning of the perfectly competitive market.
Id. at 772; Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714, 1715 (1986)
("Chicagoans state what the law reprehends in terms as narrow as possible.... Chicago is
fighting a war for private freedom of action").
18. See Flynn, The 'Is" and "Ought" of Vertical RestraintsAfter Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L.Q. 1095, 1143 (1986) [hereinafter Flynn, 'Is" and
'Ought"] (criticizing the Supreme Court's values and methodology in analyzing vertical
restraints); Flynn, supra note 13 (proposing changes in the methodology of legal analysis
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the
Jurisprudenceof Vertical Restraints:The Limitations of NeoclassicalEconomic Analysis in
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scope of the relational rights of property and contract under the circumstances of the case, in light of the general policy reasons underlying the
antitrust laws and the institutional constraints upon the judicial process, is
lost by such an approach.19 Rather than investigating the extent to which
antitrust policy should act as a constraint upon the scope of the duties one
person owes another and the community with respect to an object (property
rights), or with respect to the degree that the community will permit or
enforce the contractual relationship involved in the dispute (contract
rights), courts find themselves in a place like von Jhering's heaven of legal
concepts, 0 using definitions detached from the policies behind the law,
the reality with which they are dealing, and the consequences of their
decisions.
Instead of using the reified meanings for the concept of competition
supplied by per se analysis and the fixed definitions and deductions of
neoclassical thought, with their accompanying discredited methodologies
reminiscent of nineteenth century formalism,21 the concept of
"competition" should be understood as originally intended when the
antitrust laws were adopted-competition as a process.
The basic duty imposed upon those engaged in trade or commerce
is to avoid displacing the competitive process by collaborative
action in violation of Section 1 or displacing the competitive
process by a unilateral or conspiratorial exercise or possession of
monopoly power or attempt to monopolize in violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Act. A corresponding right to be protected from
the risks of a displacement of the competitive process is vested in
competitors and consumers injured in their business or property by
an unreasonable displacement of the competitive process in
the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125 (1987) (discussing the
political and jurisprudential dimensions of vertical distribution restraints and proposing a
method of analysis that will allow antitrust law to achieve the goals of Congress).
19. See C. MAcPHERSON, Property as Means or End?, in THE RISE AND FALL OF
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 86 (1985); Flynn, supra note 5, at 736-39;

Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities,
34 AM. U.L. REV. 939, 961, 966-67 (1985); Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in THE PoLITIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13, 18, 37 (D. Kairys 2d ed.

1990).
20. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
21. See generallyG. GILMORE, supranote 4 (discussing the evolution of American law
through the pre-Civil War period, the pre-World War II period, and the post-World War II

period).
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violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act under Section
4 of the Clayton Act.22

In order to view competition as a process or a means to an end,
instead of as an end in itself, business conduct and structure must be
evaluated in light of the normative goals of the law-goals informed by the
insights of all intellectual disciplines, including empirically based and
reflectively understood economic insights. It has been the general
consensus that the historical objectives of antitrust policy, objectives which
ought to remain in place today, include the normative ends of
(1) insuring the dispersion of economic power to protect legal,
social and political processes from undue economic power; (2)
promoting freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits; (3)
fostering the satisfaction of consumers and protecting their
property and contract rights; and (4) protecting the competitive
process as market governor.

In view of these normative goals of the law, the concept of "competition"
can only be viewed as that of a process rather than an objectively defined
rule or an abstract model with a two-dimensional picture of the world, by
which conduct or business structure should be measured. Professor Fox has
captured the essence of the concept as follows:

22. Flynn, supra note 13, at 1623-24 (footnotes omitted).
23. Flynn, Reagan Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 304-05. These goals are derived
from Flynn, supra note 17, at 779, and Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.Q. 1140, 1154 (1981), and are also reflected in the more
extensive historical analysis of M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
CAPrT SM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW AND PoLITcs 179-81 (1987) (suggesting
that the core of the antitrust debate consists of two major questions: (1) was the corporate
reorganization inevitable or desirable, and (2) what measures were necessary in adapting the'
law and administrative policy to the corporate reorganization?), and H. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTIRUST POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 108-63 (1955)
(discussing the ideological background of antitrust and the growth of opposition to trusts).
Recently, there has been an outpouring of writing by outstanding scholars like
Professors Hovenkamp, May, Millon, and Peritz on the history of federal and state antitrust
laws and their broad social, political, and economic goals. All suggest a broader complex
of values underlying antitrust law than that advanced by neoclassical advocates. A collection
of the leading articles is supplied in May, The Role of the States in the First Century of the
Sherman Act and the Larger Picture ofAntitrust History, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 94 n.5
(1990); see also Peritz, supra note 8, at 317-20 (remarking on the prospects of freeing
antitrust from the neoclassical prison of price theory, and advocating a public interest
approach to antitrust law).
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One overarching idea has unified these three concerns (distrust of
power, concern for consumers, and commitment to opportunity for
entrepreneurs): competition as process. The competition process
is the preferred governor of markets. If the impersonal forces of
competition, rather than public or private power, determine market
behavior and outcomes, power is by definition dispersed,
opportunities and incentives for firms without market power are
increased, and the results are acceptable and fair. Some measure
of productive and allocative efficiency is a by-product, because
competition tends to stimulate lowest-cost production and allocate
resources more responsively than a visible public or private
hand. 24
It is obvious that current court decisions are not following this
approach to antitrust analysis. Cases like MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo.
v. Zenith Radio Corp.,25 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.,26 and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,27 demonstrate
that the Supreme Court is following a rigid methodology. In these
decisions, the Court applies the definitions of the neoclassical model
deductively as the substantive standard for defining the goals of antitrust
policy, for determining what facts are relevant to the dispute, and for
concluding what consequences of the decision are acceptable.' The
normative values underlying the model become the normative goals of
antitrust policy. The model's deductive logic becomes the process for
determining what "facts" will be permitted to be considered "facts" for
purposes of the analysis. The model's underlying normative assumptions
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Fox, supra note 23, at 1154 (emphasis added).
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
For example, in Matsushita, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims of a

coordinated effort to price below cost and support low prices in the United States with high
prices in the protected Japan market because the neoclassical model dictated that such
conduct could not happen. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. The Court stated that no rational
businessman, driven by the single-minded pursuit of profit, would conspire with competitors
to monopolize the United States market by predatory and low-cost pricing without the hope
of recouping the lost profits plus interest. lId at 589. The Court concluded that profit
maximization-not growth or market share-was the only motive the defendants could be
assumed to have under the neoclassical model. Id at 593.
Thus, in Matsushita, the Court established that the assumptions of the neoclassical
model (that all markets are perfectly competitive and driven by rational profit maximizers)
determine what facts can be sensibly believed. Since the neoclassical theory dictates that
antitrust laws seek to maximize consumer welfare, it would be incongruous to assume that
competitors would behave in a contrary manner.
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become the sole basis for evaluating the legitimacy of appeals to other
disciplines in deciding a particular case. Moreover, the results in specific
cases are often contrary to the economic goals associated with the
neoclassical concept of "competition," as well as being contrary to the
social and political ideals inherent in the antitrust policy established by
Congress and the constitutional and other constraints upon the powers of
the judiciary.
For example, in Matsushita the Supreme Court upheld a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants where the plaintiffs claimed
defendants had engaged in a long-standing predatory pricing scheme in
consumer electronics markets by keeping prices high in Japan and low in
the United States.29 In finding for the defendants, the Court abandoned
the traditional summary judgment standard under which facts and
inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
thereby significantly impinging upon the constitutional balance between the
court's function of applying the law and the jury's role as the finder of
fact: "[I]f the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must come
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would
otherwise be necessary.""
Under the majority's view in this case, "economic sense" is to be
determined by reference to the narrow assumptions and predictions of
neoclassical price theory, not the facts of the case and the goals of the
law.3" Consequently, the Court's approach requires a "respondent to a
motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case to show that the
predictions of The Model do not follow from the assumptions of The
Model." 32 This is an impossible task where, in the analysis of legal
29. i at 578.

30. Id at 587.
31. The Court relied upon a law review article by Judge Easterbrook for the standard
it applied in this case, its analysis of the facts, and its determination of the meaning of the
law. See id at 591-92 (citing and discussing Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX.
L. Ray. 1 (1984)). Judge Easterbrook, in turn, had relied exclusively upon the assumptions
and predictions of Chicago School modeling in determining what disposition of the case
should take place, without regard for the record, the right to jury trial, the appropriate
standards for summary judgment in civil litigation, and alternative explanations for
understanding the reality of the matters litigated. See Easterbrook, supra,at 26-27.
32. Flynn, Antitrust Allegory, supra note 4, at 522. Elsewhere I have suggested that
[wihile tautologies may serve academics in the course of befuddling their
students, they scarcely serve legal reasoning and the fair resolution of lawsuits
in accord with the underlying purposes of the law and the practical requirements
of a sensible procedural system. With all due respect, the majority opinion's
method of analysis is logically absurd, inconsistent with the historical purposes
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an impingement upon the constitutional
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disputes, one relies exclusively on the deductive logic associated with the
positivism of abstract neoclassical theorizing. This occurs for the following
reasons: deductive logic rigidly dictates a major premise limiting the goals
of the law to those assumed by a concept of "competition" fixed by the
assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical price theory; deductive logic
dictates a minor premise which accepts only those "facts" and explanations
of "the facts" in accord with the assumptions underlying the model and the
categories imposed by the definitions used by the model; and deductive
logic dictates a conclusion affirming the abstract assumptions underlying
the model.33 Such an approach ignores Llewellyn's warning of "the
tendency of the crystallized legal concept to persist after the fact model
from which the concept was once derived has disappeared or changed out
of recognizability"' and Felix Cohen's warning that "[l]ogic provides the
springboard
but it does not guarantee the success of any particular
35
dive."
Subsequent evaluation of the facts in Matsushita indicates that the
behavior alleged may well have constituted strategic conduct designed to
buy market share by joint activity, thereby displacing both "competition"
and the plaintiffs' right to succeed or fail under the regime of a
competitive process.' The capture of the Matsushita majority's thinking
by the limitation of the concept of "competition" to the assumptions and
predictions of the neoclassical model precluded an evaluation of the record
from the broader perspective of the concept of "competition as a process."
Such an evaluation would have revealed that the defendants were engaged
in a joint campaign to buy market share by subsidizing below-cost sales in
the United States with high-priced sales in Japan.37 Even though the
practice may not have exhibited a predictable future profit-recovery phase
from the period of long-term price cutting in the United States, the practice
displaced the competitive process for determining success or failure of
United States firms, and the level of investment and innovation by all
competitors. The long-term social, political, and economic consequences
right to jury trial, contrary to the goals of antitrust policy and potentially
devastating to all private antitrust litigation if it is to be rigidly followed in the
future.
Flynn, Which Past is Prolog?The Futureof PrivateAntitrust Enforcement, 35 ANTrIRUST
BULL. 879, 920 (1990).

33. See Flynn, AntitrustAllegory, supra note 4, at 541-45.
34. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 15, at 27.
35. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMs AND LEGAL IDEALS 35 (1933).
36. See Williamson, DelimitingAntitrust,76 GEo. L.J. 271,298 (1987) (discussing the
Supreme Court's failure to evaluate the core economic theory underlying the plaintiffs'
allegations of predatory dumping).
37. See Note, supra note 4, at 734-44.
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to consumers and competitors of permitting such a distortion of the
competitive process are enormous. The long-term implications for the
development and implementation of a realistic and common-sense antitrust
policy by the use of such nineteenth century formalism are devastating.38
The Business Electronics case, which upheld the reversal of a jury
verdict for a price-cutting distributor who claimed it was cut off at the
behest of a competing full-price distributor, used the concept of
"competition" as defined by neoclassical modeling to alter substantially
either the role of a jury in drawing the inference of conspiracy for section
1 purposes, or the legal meaning of the concept of "price fixing" from that
which had historically prevailed in antitrust litigation.39 Justice Scalia's
confused and confusing opinion for the Court used the abstract neoclassical
concept of "competition" to confine narrowly the permissible inferences of
both "conspiracy" and "price fixing" that a jury may draw from a factual
pattern and the circumstances of a case.' This factual pattern left little
room for anything other than a clear inference that the plaintiff was cut off
at the behest of a competitor because of its price cutting, with the
consequence that consumers must pay the price that the defendant supplier
and the defendant dealer think are best for them. The majority reached this
paternalistic result because the model confines the permissible factual
inferences explaining the defendants' behavior to those consistent with the
factual assumptions of the model and the permissible inferences as to the
appropriate legal standard to the narrow range of abstract conclusions
dictated by the model.
The effect of this rigid concept of competition, to borrow from
Llewellyn once again, is that
once formulated and once they have entered into thought
processes, [concepts] tend to take on an appearance of solidity,
reality and inherent value which has no foundation in experience.
More than this: although originally formulated on the model of at
least some observed data, they tend, once they have entered into
the organization of thinking, both to suggest the presence of
38. See Flynn, Antitrust Allegory, supra note 4, at 545.
39. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727-30 (1988). The
difficulty in sorting out the meaning of the majority opinion for the concepts of conspiracy
and price fixing is that the same evidence relied upon to prove the existence of a conspiracy
will be that which is relied upon to prove the objectives of the conspiracy; hence the
confusion over whether the decision is one that limits the meaning of "conspiracy" or one
that limits the traditional meaning of "price fixing" expressed in cases like United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), and United States v. Container Corp. of
Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
40. See Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 732.
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corresponding data even when these data are not in fact present,
and to twist any fresh observation of data into conformity with the
lines and shape of the categories.4 1
In Business Electronics, it is not difficult to see why the use of the
rigid concept of "competition" and its associated black-hatted concept of
"free rider" 2 caused alternative understandings of the facts and
consequences in light of the reality of the case. The writing of an
understandable judicial opinion analyzing the facts and the law, and the
concern for the constitutional function of the jury, were both cut off by the
guillotine of deductive logic associated with the mechanical application of
the model followed by Justice Scalia in writing his confused opinion.
Use of the broader concept of "competition"--competition as a
process-and reliance upon inductive logic would have done much to
eliminate the unrealistic and confusing distortions of the facts and
reasoning in the Business Electronics decision. If viewed as a case in
which the plaintiff was claiming a right guaranteed by antitrust policy to
succeed or fail on the competitive merits, subject to a defense of legitimate
business justification for a policy of confining sales by the defendant to
certain dealers, the court and jury would have been able to evaluate the
reality of the case and determine whether the impersonal forces of
competition, rather than an unquestioned state-backed right to contractual
freedom by the seller or the complaining dealer, ought to govern the
relationship. Viewed this way, the normative goals of antitrust policy in
securing the dispersion of economic power, promoting competition on the
merits, fostering consumer satisfaction, protecting consumers' freedom of
contract and property rights, and allowing the market process of free
consumer choice to determine the "efficient" outcome would be
satisfied.4 3
41. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 15, at 28.
42. The concept of the free rider
is a rationalization for unlimited legal protection of the property and contract
rights of the proponent of the restraint. Although recognition of the free rider
purports to foster an efficient allocation of resources under the constraints of a
perfectly competitive market; it actually deflects analysis from the circumstances
in which the restraint is imposed, as well as from an evaluation of the contract
and property rights of both the victim of the restraint and of the public.... As
such, the free rider is another example of a clich6 capturing and distorting
analysis.
Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 18, at 1144 n.78.
43. To make such a standard workable, predictable, and consistent, I have long
advocated that the per se rules ought to be viewed as evidentiary standards of varying levels
of rebuttability. See Flynn, supranote 17, at 789; Flynn, supra note 13, at 1599. In the case
of vertical price fixing, I have observed that
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. In Atlantic Richfield, the majority used the abstract and meaningless
concept of "standing" to dismiss a competitor's complaint that the
defendant oil company was engaged in a vertical maximum-price-fixin
conspiracy with the purpose and effect of driving it out of business.
Through a process reminiscent of common law pleading and the forms of
action, the plaintiff was found, at a preliminary stage of the litigation, to
successfully maintained vertical price fixing is often the expression of economic
power based on market imperfections, imbalances in bargaining power, or the
presence of some level of oligopoly-like power due to trademarks or product
differentiation. As such, vertical price fixing directly interferes with the freedom
and opportunity of retail competitors to compete on the merits and usually results
in higher prices to consumers. It enables the proponent of a restraint to assert an
absolute property right and to suppress distributor competition on price, denying
the right of independent distributors to succeed or fail on the competitive merits.
Consequently, a relatively conclusive presumption of illegality is justified in cases

of vertical price fixing.
Courts should work out over time the types of evidence that will overcome
the presumption of illegality and determine when factual issues should be
submitted to the jury.... mhe scope of efficiency and other defenses can be
defined in the context of the goals of antitrust policy and the realities of
individual cases rather than be assumed in light of the abstract definitions and
unreal normative and factual assumptions of the neoclassical model.
Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 18, at 1148-49.
44. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1895 (1990).
The concept of "standing," another modem candidate for von Jhering's heaven of legal
concepts, is a fiction because a finding that a particular party does not have "standing"---that
he or she is outside the case or controversy doctrine-is to say something about the meaning
or the scope of the underlying law without saying so. See McCormack, The Justiciability
Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HAsTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 595 (1987) (criticizing the
doctrine of standing and suggesting that a decision to deny access to the court alters the
nature of constitutional law); see also Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ.
221, 229 (1988) ("The essence of a true standing question should be seen as a question of
substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory or constitutional provision whose
protection is invoked.").
Use of the reified concept of "standing" permits a court to mask or hide what is being
said about the underlying law and the scope of the rights or duties in a particular
circumstance, behind strange and unmanageable definitions of causation or obscure
definitions of what conduct violates the law or does not violate the law. The modem use
of the "standing" doctrine is reminiscent of the use of the concept of "substantive due
process" in the Court's era of formalism, which permitted the Court to decide whatever it
wished without having to explain itself. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(striking down, as an abridgement of freedom of contract and therefore a violation of
substantive due process, a New York law which limited the hours a bakery employee could
work in a single week); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (relying upon
substantive due process in striking down a Louisiana statute which prohibited unlicensed
insurance companies from selling insurance for Louisiana property, since such a statute
would prevent a party from exercising freedom of contract).

1990]

COMPETITIVE PROCESS

lack "standing" because it had not suffered an "injury" of the type the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent.4 5 The low prices realized by the
vertical maximum-price-fixing conspiracy benefitted consumers, and only
that conduct which is "competition reducing" was said to be condemned
by the antitrust laws." The concept of "competition" was equated with
the narrow and static meaning given it by the neoclassical model, the
meaning of "consumer welfare" was limited to its short-term sense of low
prices, and deductive logic was relied upon to dictate that consumers were
not injured by the price reduction or the elimination of the plaintiff from
the market.4 7
Reliance upon such a narrow and deductively driven form of analysis
at the early stages of litigation not only deprives a plaintiff and the court
of an opportunity for a full exploration of the facts of the plaintiff's claim,
but also deprives all concerned of a full exploration of the reality of the
dispute and the long-term consequences of the practice. For example, the
elimination of discounters in gasoline marketing has frequently been
associated with the long-term increase in prices by the major oil companies
to the detriment of consumers.48 The Atlantic Richfield opinion further
poses the risk of wiping out all competitor suits to enforce antitrust policy,
since the opinion clearly declares that the sole objective of antitrust policy
is "consumer welfare." 49 Consumer welfare is equated with low prices
in the short term, even if low prices are achieved by a displacement of the
competitive process determining price. On the other hand, competitors
suing in circumstances where "consumer welfare" is injured will
necessarily be suing in the stead of consumers, which raises other technical
problems. Standing-type defenses may well be used to preclude recovery
in some future case on the ground of "indirectness of the injury" to the
competitor."
These decisions demonstrate that the mechanical application of
neoclassical thought, to the exclusion of all other insights, cuts off a full
analysis of the facts, distorts evidence to fit the needs of the model, ignores
45. Atlantic Richfield, 110 S. Ct. at 1889.
46. Id. at 1894.
47. See id at 1892.
48. See "PricingFlap" Pump Wars: Small Gasoline Dealers Say Big Oil is Driving
Them Out of Business, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 6; see also F. ALLVINE & J.
PATTERSON, HIGHWAY ROBBERY: AN ANALYSIs OF THE GASOLINE CRIsis (1974)

(discussing the role of major oil companies in the 1970s oil shortage and the fall of the
competitive market); F. ALLViNE & J. PATTERSON, COMPETITION LTD.: THE MARKETING
OP GASOLINE (1972) (discussing the archaic and wasteful gasoline marketing system and the
importance of "intertype competition" between large and independent marketers).
49. See Atlantic Richfield, 110 S. Ct. at 1892.
50. See Flynn, supra note 32, at 879.
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other values inherent in antitrust policy and the legal process generally, and
does a disservice to the appropriate role of economic analysis in antitrust
litigation. One form of simplistic economic analysis is substituted for a
reflective and empirically based form of economic analysis and is used to
displace an inductive legal process, the goals of antitrust policy mandated
by Congress, and the constitutional and procedural constraints upon the
legal process. These cases also demonstrate that the mechanical application
of a static model outside the classroom can lead to a paradoxical decision,
purporting to advance "consumer welfare," while actually undermining the
narrow "consumer welfare" goal the model claims to promote, as well as
the goals of antitrust policy mandated by Congress.
III. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
IN ANTITRUST POLICY

Currently, there is a serious need for creative and constructive
empirical social science research. This includes economic research aware
of its own assumptions and the reality of particular disputes, of the
constitutional and procedural constraints upon the legal process, and of the
normative values underlying the law in general and antitrust law in
particular. When considered alongside insights into antitrust policy
provided by other social sciences, jurisprudence, and contemporary
understandings of reality, economics can help inform makers of antitrust
policy of what its rules ought to be in the adjudication of appropriate
distributive and allocative relationships of individuals, institutions, and
society.5 1
The underlying standard by which to judge any legal system and the
institutions it adopts to facilitate the ends of society is whether the
institutions adopted deal with the reality of disputes, conform with the
institutional limitations upon a fair legal process, and comport with the
deeper understandings of justice which prevail in society.5 Among the
goals embraced within the concept of justice underlying American antitrust
policy are: fostering equality of access to the market; 3 ensuring
51. See Flynn, The Chicken and the Egg, supra note 11, at 69.
52. Professor Louis B. Schwartz has written most eloquently on this theme. See
Schwartz, "Justice"and Other Non-Economic Goals ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076
(1979) [hereinafter Schwartz, "Justice"]; Schwartz, American Antitrust Laws and Free
Enterprise, 2 Swiss REv. INT'L L. 3 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, American Antitrust];

Schwartz, InstitutionalSize and Individual Liberty: AuthoritarianAspects of Bigness, 55
Nw. U.L. REv. 4 (1960) [hereinafter Schwartz, InstitutionalSize].
53. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)

(conspiracy to put a single merchant out of business violated the Sherman Act even without
a showing of significant impact on competition); see also H. THORELU, supra note 23, at
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procedural due process for distributors dependent on suppliers4 and in
economic relationships generally; 55 preventing the unilateral or collective
private assumption of the political power to determine prices and access to
the market; 56 redressing the imbalance in bargaining relationships;57
preventing undue wealth transfers from consumers to producers; 5 and
protecting basic rights of labor, property, and free exchange.59 With these
as the normative goals of antitrust policy, a variety of social and economic
goals are realized. In order to encourage the efficient allocation and
conservation of resources, innovation, and the reduction of the need for
564-72 (discussing the background and philosophy of the Sherman Act).
54. See Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, ch. 1038, § 2, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1988)) (entitled "An Act-to supplement the
antitrust laws of the United States in order to balance the power now heavily weighed in
favor of automobile manufacturers"); Petroleum Marking Practices Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-297, tit. 1, § 102, 92 Stat. 324 (1978) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-06 (1988))
(providing for the protection of distributors and retailers of motor fuel by enacting
guidelines to which a franchisor must adhere in terminating a relationship with a franchisee).
55. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (holding that
Exchange's removal of direct telephone lines to nonmember broker-dealers without notice
or an opportunity to be heard violated antitrust laws); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (holding that requiring a manufacturer's goods be
certified before sold and conspiring to deny such a certification without just cause violated
antitrust laws).
56. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 20-21 (1977) (arguing
that the objective of antitrust laws is to maintain a fair and equitable competitive process);
Fox, The Sherman AntitrustAct and the World-Let Freedom Ring, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 109
(1990) (concluding that Ameica is committed to a free-market economy where action by
powerful political actors is constrained by antitrust laws); Millon, The Sherman Act and the
Balance of Power,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (1988) (stating that the exclusion or elimination
of competition fosters the evils of monopoly-illegitimate political influence, control over
price, and the power to prevent rivalry); Schwartz, "Justice", supra note 52, at 1078
(instructing that one political goal of antitrust laws is averting the need for intensive and
ongoing government regulation of the competitive process).
57. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (holding that
consignment agreements between oil companies and local retailers that coerce retailers into
maintaining price minimums violate antitrust laws); Peritz, supra note 10 (stating that
antitrust law's prohibitions on restraint of trade practices regulate the ways manufacturers
may distribute their products).
58. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged,34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982) (positing that antitrust
laws were passed primarily to further the goal of preventing unfair acquisitions of
consumers' wealth by firms with market power).
59. See May, supra note 23, at 103 (contending that safeguarding labor, property and
exchange rights from illegitimate economic interference maximizes efficiency and prosperity
for citizens and society as a whole).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

affirmative government regulation, private markets function in ways that
are socially acceptable, yet constrained by society's understanding of
justice.' Moreover, these are the goals Congress has mandated that
antitrust policy achieve.6 1
Contrary to the views of some, the legislative history of the antitrust
laws is not excessively vague,62 or one reflecting the congressional
adoption of a neoclassical economic theory63 not yet in existence at the
time the basic antitrust laws were adopted." Rather, Congress saw a

multiplicity of goals for antitrust policy, including
an intent to prevent unjust wealth transfers, to secure social
values, to curb the political power of trusts, to secure equality of
opportunity for every person seeking to engage in trade and to
preclude coercion in excluding persons from business or forcing
them by contract to resell at prices dictated by suppliers without
regard for "efficiency" as defined by the ideology underlying

neoclassical economic theorizing.
In a system of divided government, it is of course incumbent upon
courts to implement the general policies of the legislative branch expressed
in statutes, not to substitute their own ideological value judgments for
those expressed by Congress. In the case of long-standing general statutes
like the antitrust laws, courts face the task of preserving and fostering the
underlying normative values sought by the legislative branch, in the face
60. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at 21.
61. See 21 CONG. REC. 2461-62 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (an objective of
the Act is to prohibit wealth transfers by conspiracies involving interstate commerce); 21
CONG. REC. 2456-58 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (the Act is intended to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce in order to safeguard the "industrial liberty" of the United
States citizens); 20 CONG. RFC. 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones) (it is imperative for
the federal government to control trusts in order to prevent undue wealth transfers).
62. But see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTTRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTrrRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEMR APPLICATION

106, at 14-16 (1978) (contending that

the legislative history of antitrust regulations is vague and fails to communicate definitive
guidelines as to legal and illegal business practices).
63. But see R. BOR.K, supra note 9, at 61-66 (stating that the legislative history of the
Sherman Act displays exclusive concern for consumer welfare by outlawing trusts and
business combinations which prevent full and free competition).
64. Flynn, Reagan Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 260; see also Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 213, 249 (1985) ("[tlhe legislative
histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything resembling a dominant concern
for economic efficiency").
65. Flynn, Reagan Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 281 (footnotes omitted) (citing
and discussing legislative history of the Sherman Act).
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of an evolving and changing reality presenting new challenges to longstanding normative values expressed by the law. The slavish following of
abstract neoclassical theory and the failure to incorporate reflectively held
and empirically based economic insights into the broader mix of social and
political values underlying the law and the legal process "destroy
democratic values and subvert justice to render the current social order
politically legitimate."'
Further, in this modem age of large economic institutions, stateorchestrated international competition, franchising, and major distortions
of the competitive process by government regulation and tax policy, it is
essential that these historical goals of antitrust policy be given effect by the
courts. This is especially true if we are to retain an economy driven by
individual initiative, equality of economic opportunity, innovation,' and
a reasonably balanced distribution of wealth enabling widespread access to
educational and economic opportunities. In a society with a broader
consensus on the meaning of economic justice, confining our basic laws
governing the definition of the scope of individual and collective property
and contract rights to a concept of "competition" premised upon inherent
and absolute property and contract rights, operating in a nonexistent world
of perfect competition, is scarcely a reflective methodology for resolving
disputes concerning the appropriate role of law in regulating economic
relationships. Although such methodology may engender certainty and
66. Curran, Beyond Economic Concepts and Categories:A Democratic Refiguration
of Antitrust Law, 28 ST. Louis U.L. 349, 361 (1987).
67. The preoccupation of Chicago School analysis with static price theory as the central
guide for antitrust policy has deflected antitrust rules and policy from other perhaps more
important economic objectives of antitrust policy, such as innovation and progress. Michael
Porter observed that
[t]here has been, and continues to be, a focus in antitrust analysis on price/cost
margins, or the ability of an industry to elevate price above cost (allocative
efficiency).... More recently there has been a growing concern with economies
of scale (or static efficiency), driven by Chicago School economics. Only scant
attention is paid to innovation or progressiveness as an important goal that
antitrust policy should concern itself with....
My view is that we must turn this ranking of the goals of antitrust on its
head. It is well established in economics that progressiveness or innovativeness
is by far the most important source of economic growth and welfare, greatly outweighing price/cost margins (allocative efficiency), or even static efficiency. The
central focus of antitrust policy, in my view, ought to be on fostering
progressiveness, defined broadly to include not only technological innovation but
new ways of competing in product, marketing, service, and so on. When faced
with tradeoffs, we should weigh progressiveness much higher than static
efficiency or a snapshot of price-cost margins.
Innovation, Rivalry, and Competitive Advantage: Interview with Professor Michael E.
Porter, 5 ANTiTRUST 5, 5 (1991).
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predictability, it is a false certainty and a misleading predictability which
will exact a price from individual and collective justice-much like the
price now being exacted by the collective infatuation with the simpleminded, "supply side" economic ideology of the 1980s that one
presidential candidate once labeled "voodoo economics. "s
In order to restore a sensible decision-making process that conforms
with the goals of the law and the constitutional, procedural, and inductive
reasoning constraints upon the legal process, some discretion and flexibility
is needed in the concepts used to decide antitrust cases. The concepts need
to be understood as functional devices linldng fact to policy in light of real
world consequences. Furthermore, it must be understood that the relevance,
meaning, and application of the concepts relied upon are dependent
primarily upon inductive, not deductive, reasoning. Fact and policy interact
to induce the relevance, meaning, and application of the concepts involved;
this is the essence of the common law analytical process. The analytical
process must not only produce a level of discretion for accommodating all
of the facts, policies, and consequences relevant to antitrust law, but must
also be capable of producing reasonably predictable standards by which
courts, parties, juries, and those subject to the law may determine whether
conduct will or will not violate the law in future cases.
In order to achieve these objectives, I have argued elsewhere that the
concept of competition should be understood as "competition as a process"
and that the policies the competitive process is designed to achieve include
those outlined in this article,' in addition to the overall objective of
achieving justice in a particular case.7 ° To accommodate the facts unique
68. Raines, Supply-Side Battle Rages on 2 Fronts,N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1981, at B26,
col. 3. It was George Bush who described Reagan's tax-cutting proposals in this manner,
when campaigning against Reagan for the presidency in 1980.
69. Elsewhere, I have utilized the summary of antitrust goals developed by Professor
Eleanor Fox as the most concise articulation of the goals Congress mandated the antitrust
laws to fulfill, and have proposed that Congress adopt them as the following preamble to
the Sherman Act:
Preamble: Congress hereby finds and declares that the goals of antitrust policy
are: 1. The dispersion of economic power; 2. Freedom and opportunity to
compete on the merits; 3. Satisfaction of consumers; and 4. Protection of the
competitive process as market governor.
Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 18, at 1151 (citing Fox, supra note 23, at 1182); see also
Spivak, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercise of Monopoly Power: A
Response, 52 ANTITRUST U. 651, 653 (1983) (a more lengthy list of goals that might be
made a preamble to the Sherman Act).
70. See generally J. RAWLS, supra note I. Rawls' book is perhaps the most
comprehensive and influential attempt to restate a contemporary theory of justice. In chapter
five, Rawls sets forth an extensive analysis of his concept ofjustice in the economic sphere.

Rawls favors a market system, but strongly advocates that the distributive consequences of
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to particular cases, as well as evolutions in reality, I have further suggested
that the per se rules of antitrust ought to be understood as evidentiary
presumptions of illegality subject to varying levels of rebuttability. I
Where the "rule of reason" is applied, it should be understood that there
is no presumption of illegality by a court, but that the conduct is measured
by a set of factors historically relied on by courts to sort out the reasonable
from the unreasonable.7 2 In this way, a sufficiently certain and predictable
legal standard will be utilized, but it will have enough flexibility to account
for the complex of goals of antitrust policy, the facts and circumstances
unique to individual disputes, the insights from economics and other liberal
arts, the inductive nature of legal reasoning, the procedural standards which

should be followed by our courts, and the division of decision-making
authority between judges and juries mandated by the Constitution.

the system adopted can not be ignored due to the fact that the conditions of perfect
competition are "seldom if ever fully satisfied in the real world" and because market failures
often cause serious dislocations. Id at 272. The further point is made that a market system
cannot be divorced from background legal and political institutions, including equality of
opportunity to economic and educational advantages. Id. While Rawls would create a
complex series of governmental institutions to achieve these objectives and the ultimate
objective of his two principles of justice, I submit that the underlying concept of justice and
the methodology by which it is to be implemented is fully consistent with the arguments of
this article. See iL at 302-03. Understanding the concept of competition as a process and
as a means to an end permits the bridging of the gap between allocative and distributive
justice and the broader range of values underlying antitrust policy. Ignoring distributive
concerns by neoclassical theory in antitrust policy effectively divorces the analysis from
commonly accepted concepts of justice in the economic sphere, and renders antitrust policy
a shell without any normative content.
71. See Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 18, at 1148.
72. Id. at 1150-51. These factors are the ones relied on in Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
I&. at 238. It is noteworthy that the factors to be considered do not include a consideration
of relevant markets or power in the markets defined. Where the goals of antitrust policy are
considered to be broader than those which merely prevent a conspiratorial reduction of
output, relevant market and power considerations are not necessary factors, although they
may be factors which tip the scale in close cases.
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CONCLUSION

As you proceed through this debate and discussion on the appropriate
role of economic analysis in antitrust enforcement, beware of the inmates
of von Jhering's heaven of legal concepts-abstract concepts detached from
reality and the normative goals which gave birth to them73 -dictating the
parameters of the debate. Beware of the force of deductive logic promising
a misleading and misguided certainty, and displacing the inductive logic
of a pragmatic yet principled legal process. Also beware of the use of
deductive logic in confining the debate to the hidden assumptions of fact
and value, which accompanies the inmates of von Jhering's heaven
whenever they are called upon to determine the rights and liabilities of
parties to real disputes-disputes otherwise decided by the constitutionally
prescribed institutions of judge and jury pursuant to laws adopted by the
community to implement its underlying commitment to justice. Beware of
lawyers pretending to be economists and economists pretending to be
lawyers, each using concepts from the other discipline without an
appreciation for the intellectual, normative, and methodological limitations
imposed upon the concepts being used.
Above all, beware of those who would confie law and its concepts
to fixed definitions detached from reality and the normative values
underlying the law in order to avoid the discretion inherent in legal
decision making, and who would impose their fixed ideological beliefs of
the "ought" while ignoring both society's views of the "ought" and the
reality of the "is." Decision making in law and in economics cannot avoid
dealing with the real world in light of long-term cultural values and the
practical consequences of the decision made. It cannot avoid doing so if
the legal system is to serve the ends of resolving disputes in accord with
reality, by a process operating within the constitutional and other
limitations required of any system that is to meet the demand for an
informed, rational decision-making process and a long-term commitment
to justice.

73. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.

